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Abstract
We examine the choice of policy instrument price, quantity, or a mix of the
two when two pollutants are regulated and ﬁrms’ abatement costs are private in-
formation. A key parameter that aﬀects this choice is the technological externality
between the abatement eﬀorts involved, i.e., whether they are substitutes or com-
plements. If they are complements, a mix policy instrument with a tax on one
pollutant and a quota on the other is sometime preferable, even if the pollutants
are identical in terms of beneﬁts and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes,
the mix policy is dominated by taxes or quotas.
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1 Introduction
In 1974, Weitzman wrote one of the most inﬂuential papers in environmental economics.
It deals with the choice of policy instruments when ﬁrms’ costs are private information.
When applied to pollution mitigation issues, the choice is between a price, or market-
based instrument (such as a tax or tradable emission allowances) and a quantity instru-
ment (such as an emission standard or quota). Weitzman (1974) shows how this choice
is driven by two parameters: the slopes of the marginal beneﬁt of reducing pollution
and of the ﬁrm’s abatement costs. A price-based instrument should be preferred when
beneﬁts are relatively ﬂat compared to the costs, while quantity-based instruments are
better when beneﬁts are steeper than costs.
The analysis by Weitzman concerns the choice of a policy instrument to regulate
a single pollutant. However, in practice, production processes are typically accompa-
nied by the emissions of multiple pollutants. Furthermore, abatement technologies can
jointly reduce several pollutants at the same time. In some cases, the joint abatement
creates some synergies (often referred to as ancillary beneﬁts) while in others cases,
certain pollutants are reduced at the cost of increasing others. Thus, pollutants can
be considered as complements or substitutes in the abatement process (Burtraw et al.
2003, Bollen et al. 2009, and Holland 2010).
There are examples abound.1 For instance, catalytic converters for cars simultane-
ously reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOC)
(Bruvoll and Medin 2003), and strategies to reduce nitrogen from sewage plants also
reduce phosphorus (Elofsson 2003). In the case of substitutes, recent changes in technol-
ogy to alleviate the acid deposition problem indicate some disadvantages to the climate
change issue: scrubbers installed in power plants neutralise the acids at the expense of
1It is worth noting that interactions among pollutants might also occur on the damage side. For
example, the build-up of ozone (one of the substances for which national air quality standards are most
widely violated) results from complicated reactions involving several pollutants in the presence of solar
energy. NOx emissions retard ozone formation (Innes 1981 and Repetto, 1987) while methane enhances
ozone transport. Therefore, a methane emission reduction strategy would yield the co-beneﬁt of reducing
of ozone concentrations while NOx controls would be counterproductive in controlling ozone levels.
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increased energy consumption, coal burning and increased carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sions (Moslener and Requate 2007, Holland 2010). The increased use of biomass also
creates some trade-oﬀs in emissions control. Biomass is helpful in reducing CO2 emis-
sions; however, it also causes increased emissions of particulate matter (PM), carbon
monoxide (CO) and VOC. In turn, this means a higher risk to human health for the
population exposed to these pollutants (see Syri et al. 2001, Bra¨nnlund and Kristo¨m
2001 and Proost and Van Regemorter 2003 for empirical evidence).2
In this paper, we extend Weitzman’s Prices vs.Quantities analysis to multiple pol-
lutants. We compare the performance of diﬀerent policy mixes when ﬁrms can reduce
the emissions of two pollutants simultaneously through the use of multi-pollutant abate-
ment technologies. We consider two cases. (1) the case where the regulator knows that
the abatement technology used by the ﬁrm exhibits some complementarity or substitu-
tivity in abatement eﬀorts, but there is asymmetric information on the magnitude of
the marginal cost; and (2) the case where the regulator does not know whether abate-
ment eﬀorts are complements or substitutes, which is the only source of asymmetric
information. Both cases are relevant in practice. It could be that the properties of the
technology used for abating pollution are well known, although the cost of implementing
and running this technology is ﬁrm speciﬁc. Alternatively, abatement might require de-
velopment or adoption of new technologies for which the externality in abatement cost
between the two pollutants is unknown a priori. Also, sometimes there are many tech-
nologies available in the market; some could exhibit some complementarity and some
could exhibit some substitution. It is the ﬁrm’s own decision to choose among them.3
We study the eﬀects of the choice among only emission taxes, only emission norms
or non-tradable quotas, and a policy mix where taxes are used to control the emissions
2Other examples can be found in agriculture. Farmers can decrease their use of chemical fertilizers
(and thus CO2 emissions) by substituting with natural fertilizers from cattle breeding but at a cost of
producing more methane. Pesticide can be complements or substitutes to fertilizers depending on the
crop and the targeted pests.
3For instance, an electricity producer can switch to several sources of energy. Switching from coal to
natural gas reduces the emissions of both NOx and CO2, while switching from natural gas to biomass
potentially reduces CO2 emissions and increases NOx emissions.
3
of one pollutant while an emission norm is intended to reduce the emissions of the
other. In practice, market-based and quantity policy instruments are used to regulate
multi-pollutant ﬁrms. For example, in Europe emissions of SO2 and NOx are regulated
through taxes and in the U.S. emissions of SO2 are regulated through cap-and-trade
while the emissions of several local air pollutants, such as particulate matter or VOC,
are mainly controlled through emission standards.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study looking at the eﬀects of the
choice of policy mixes involving diﬀerent combinations of price-based and quantity-based
regulations in the context of multiple pollutants and asymmetric information. Several
papers have analyzed the design of environmental policies with multiple pollutants but
under perfect information. In Endres (1985) and Repetto (1987), two pollutants interact
in the social damage function, while in our paper they do not. Moslener and Requate
(2007) and Kuosman and Laukkanen (2011) deal with multiple pollutant abatement
strategies in a dynamic framework. Their focus is on the optimal emission path, and
not on the choice of regulation instruments. Climate change mitigation models also
consider multi-gas control strategies (see for instance Nordhaus 2000 and Tol 2006)
to evaluate emission path scenarios. Montero (2001) and Caplan and Emilson (2005)
analyze the design of environmental regulations with several pollutants. Contrary to
our paper, they consider only one instrument, namely marketable emission allowances.
Regarding the interaction of policies in the context of a single pollutant, some au-
thors have analyzed the welfare eﬀects of a hybrid policy encompassing both price and
quantity mechanisms in Weitzman (1974)’s framework (see for instance Roberts and
Spence 1976 and Pizer 2002). Notably, Mandell (2008) shows that with several ﬁrms
and one pollutant, a mixed scheme consisting of taxing some ﬁrms and regulating oth-
ers through a cap-and-trade system might be more eﬃcient. Similarly, we provide some
rationale for a mix policy where one pollutant is taxed while the other is limited by an
emission standard.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we compute the abatement levels
and welfare under the three policy instruments mentioned above when the regulator
knows whether the pollutants are substitutes or complements, but there is asymmetric
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information regarding the marginal abatement costs. In Section 3, we consider the
case when the regulator does not observe whether the pollutants are substitutes or
complements. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Complementarity or substitutivity known by the regu-
lator
A ﬁrm is emitting two pollutants: pollutant 1 and pollutant 2. The pollutants are
symmetric in terms of costs for the ﬁrm and for society. The cost of reducing emissions
by qi units for i = 1, 2 for the ﬁrm is
C(q1, q2, ω, θ) =
mq21
2
+
mq22
2
+ ωq1q2 + θ(q1 + q2).
The parameter ω captures the complementarity or substitutivity of the two pollu-
tants. If ω < 0 (ω > 0), the two pollutants are complements (substitutes) in the cost
functions in the sense that reducing pollution of one pollutant decreases (increases) the
marginal cost of reducing pollution of the other. The parameters m and ω are common-
knowledge for i = 1, 2. By contrast, following Weitzman (1974), θ is private information.
The regulator believes that θ ∈ [θ, θ] and that the expected value of θ is zero: E [θ] = 0.
Let the beneﬁt from reducing emissions of pollutant i be
B(qi) = aqi − b
2
q2i . (1)
Here we also assume symmetry and separability: a reduction of pollutant i does not
reduce the damage due to pollutant j.
Total welfare with pollution reductions q1 and q2 is
W (q1, q2, ω, θ) = B(q1) +B(q2)− C(q1, q2, ω, θ).
Consistent with Weitzman (1974), marginal costs and beneﬁts are linear with pollution
abatement:
Ci(q1, q2, ω, θ) = mqi + ωqj + θ
5
and
Bi(qi) = a− bqi
for i = 1, 2 and j = i. We assume m + ω > 0 and m+ ω > θ to insure increasing and
strictly convex marginal costs.4 Similarly, the beneﬁt function is increasing and weakly
concave: Bi(qi) = a− bqi > 0 and Bii(qi) = −b ≤ 0 for every qi ∈ [0, q¯i] and i = 1, 2.
We ﬁrst determine the eﬃcient pollution abatement before examining regulations.
For a given realisation of ω, the ﬁrst-best emission abatements (q∗1 , q∗2) maximise the
expost welfare W (q1, q2, ω, θ), which yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
Bi(q
∗
i ) = Ci(q
∗
i , q
∗
j , ω, θ)
for i = 1, 2 with j = i. The marginal beneﬁt of each pollutant should be equal to its
marginal cost. Since the two pollutants are symmetric, eﬃcient abatement is the same,
q∗1 = q
∗
2 = q
∗. Substituting with the functional forms, the above condition simpliﬁes to
a− bq∗ = (m+ ω)q∗ + θ (2)
for i = 1, 2 with j = i. Therefore, expost eﬃcient abatement levels q∗1 = q∗2 = q∗ are
deﬁned as5
q∗ =
a− θ
b+m+ ω
.
The quantity regulation (hereinafter referred to as quota) maximizes expected total
welfare E[W (q1, q2, ω, θ)] with respect to quotas that deﬁne minimal abatement levels q1
and q2.
6 It leads to the ﬁrst-order condition of equalizing marginal beneﬁt with expected
marginal costs:
Bi(qi) = E[Ci(qi, qj , ω, θ)]
4That is, Ci(q1, q2, ω, θ) > 0, Cii(q1, q2, ω, θ) > 0, and Cii(q1, q2, ω, θ)Cjj(q1, q2, ω, θ) −
[Cij(q1, q2, ω, θ)]
2 > 0 for any qi ∈ [0, q¯i] for i, j = 1, 2 and j = i, where q¯i is an upper bound on
abatement (e.g., pollution reduction form laisser-faire). Moslener and Requate (2007) have similar as-
sumptions on the cost function. They imply that the second-order conditions of the maximization
programs below hold.
5To simplify notation, we write q∗ instead of q∗(ω, θ) even though ex post eﬃcient abatements depend
on ω and θ.
6Quotas are obviously binding.
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for i = 1, 2, j = i. With symmetric beneﬁt and costs, the quotas are the same q1 = q2 = q
and the above ﬁrst-order condition simpliﬁes to
a− bq = (m+ ω)q. (3)
The quotas are therefore
q¯ =
a
b+m+ ω
= q∗ +
θ
b+m+ ω
(4)
for both pollutants.7
Under the price regulation (hereinafter referred to as tax), a ﬁrm of cost type θ
reacts to the tax rate τi for pollutant i by equalising its marginal abatement cost to the
tax rate for i = 1, 2: 8
τi = Ci(qi, qj, ω, θ) (5)
for i = 1, 2, j = i and every θ ∈ [θ, θ] . The regulator maximizes expected welfare
E[W (q1, q2, ω, θ)] subject to the ﬁrm’s reaction constraints (5) for i = 1, 2. Since pollu-
tants are symmetric, the tax rate is the same τ1 = τ2 = τ and so are abatement levels
under tax qτ1 = q
τ
2 = q
τ . The ﬁrm’s reaction (or incentive-compatibility) constraints (5)
for i = 1, 2 simplify to
τ = (m+ ω)qτ + θ. (6)
Maximising E[W (qτ , qτ , ω, θ)] with respect to τ under the ﬁrm’s reaction constraint (6)
leads the regulator to choose the tax rate corresponding to the marginal beneﬁt at the
exante ﬁrst-best τ = a− bq¯, while the ﬁrm reacts by choosing
qτ =
τ − θ
m+ ω
=
a− θ
m+ ω
− b
m+ ω
q¯ =
a
b+m+ ω
− θ
m+ ω
= q¯ − θ
m+ ω
. (7)
Under the mix policy, one pollutant is regulated with quotas while the other is taxed.
The quota q¯ is deﬁned as before in (4), while the optimal tax rate is still τ = a − bq¯.
The ﬁrm reacts by abating to equalise marginal cost to tax:
7Notice that q¯ = E[q∗] as in Weitzman (1974).
8To simplify notation, we write qτ instead of qτ (ω, θ) even though abatements under tax depend on
ω and θ.
7
τ = mq + ωq + θ. (8)
Therefore, unlike with only tax, under the mix policy the abatement level for the
other pollutant is ﬁxed by the quota, which also constrains the abatement level of the
pollutant taxed. The ﬁrst-order condition (8) leads to the abatement level
qτ =
τ − θ
m
− ω
m
q =
a− θ
m
− ω + b
m
q¯ =
a
b+m+ ω
− θ
m
= q¯ − θ
m
. (9)
Let us summarise our analysis in two pictures. We graph the abatement beneﬁt and
abatement cost functions for complements and substitutes (when marginal costs are
higher and lower than expected) in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. We denote a positive
realisation of θ by θ+ and a negative one by θ−.
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q0

τ
B′(q)
(m+ ω)q
(m+ ω)q + θ+
mq + ωq¯ + θ+
(m+ ω)q + θ−
mq + ωq¯ + θ−
qτ q¯τ q∗ q¯ q∗ q¯τ qτ
Case ω < 0
Figure 1. Complement pollutants ω < 0 known
In Figure 1, we represent the case where ω < 0. The quota level q¯ is set where the
marginal beneﬁt curve B′(q) = a−bq crosses the expected marginal cost curve (m+ω)q.
The tax level τ is equal to the marginal beneﬁt and the expected marginal cost at q¯.
When the realised cost is lower than expected, i.e. θ−, the realised marginal cost curve
under only taxes lies below the expected one with the same slope (m + ω). The ﬁrm
then chooses to abate both pollutants up to qτ , where the realised marginal cost under
taxes on both pollutants equals the tax level τ .
Under the mix policy, one pollutant is ﬁxed by the quota, and thus the ﬁrm’s marginal
abatement is mq + ωq + θ−. It crosses the expected marginal cost curve (m + ω)q for
an abatement level q¯. Moreover, note that since the slope of the expected marginal
cost curve is (m + ω), while the slope of the marginal cost curve under the mix policy
is m, the latter is steeper for complement pollutants, since m > m + ω (the reverse
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holds for substitutes as m < m + ω in such case). Therefore, the abatement level q¯τ
is lower than under the regulation that imposes taxes on both pollutants (reversely, it
is higher for substitute pollutants, see Figure 2).9 The abatement level under taxes on
both pollutants is also larger than under quotas on both pollutants when the realisation
of θ is negative. Since the ﬁrm compares the marginal cost to the beneﬁt of abatement,
which is the tax level calibrated on an expected higher cost, it ﬁnds it proﬁtable to abate
further to save taxes.
Hence, with only taxes, both pollutant abatements are adjusted by the ﬁrm, while
under the mix policy only the taxed pollutant is adjusted - say pollutant 1- while the
other, i.e. pollutant 2, is emitted according to the quota. If the pollutants are comple-
ments (ω < 0, see Figure 1), the adjustment of pollutant 2 abatement further reduces
the abatement cost of pollutant 1. As a consequence, the ﬁrm further increases the
abatement of pollutant 1 when pollutant 2 is taxed, in contrast to when it regulated
with quotas, and so q¯τ < qτ . The reverse holds if the pollutants are substitutes (ω > 0,
see Figure 2). Since the marginal abatement cost of pollutant 1 decreases to a larger
extent if pollutant 2 is regulated though a quota, q¯τ > qτ in such case.
The case when marginal costs are higher than expected is symmetric. Since θ+ > 0,
the realised marginal cost curve when both pollutants are regulated through taxes lies
above the expected one with the same slope (m+ ω). Under the mix policy, the ﬁrm’s
marginal abatement is mq + ωq + θ+. In Figure 1, the slope of the marginal abatement
cost under the mix policy is higher than the slope of the expected marginal cost, as
pollutants are complements. Hence, there is more abatement under the mix policy than
under tax for the taxed pollutant. The reverse holds in Figure 2.
9Note that if ω = 0, then qτ = qτ since the slope of the marginal cost curve for one pollutant does
not depend on the regulation instrument for the other.
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
qq¯
0
q¯τ qτ q∗ q∗ qτ q¯τ
τ
mq + ωq¯ + θ−
(m+ ω)q + θ−
(m+ ω)q
(m+ ω)q + θ+
B′(q) mq + ωq¯ + θ+
Case ω > 0
Figure 2: Substitute pollutants ω > 0 known
Consistent with Figures 1 and 2, we can rank abatement levels using (4), (7) and
(9). It leads to Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 Abatement under tax qτ , under quota q¯, and under the mix policy for the
taxed pollutant q¯τ are ranked as follows:
(a) If pollutants are complements ω < 0:
– If b > |ω|, then qτ < q¯τ < q∗ < q¯ for costs higher than expected and q¯ <
q∗ < q¯τ < qτ for costs lower than expected.
–If b < |ω|, then qτ < q∗ < q¯τ < q¯ for costs higher than expected and q¯ < q¯τ < q∗ <
qτ for costs lower than expected.
(b) If pollutants are substitutes, then ω > 0, q¯τ < qτ < q∗ < q¯ for costs higher than
expected and q¯ < q∗ < qτ < q¯τ for costs lower than expected.
Note that if pollutants are complements and b > |ω|, the optimal level of abatement
lies between q¯τ and q¯ regardless of θ. When b < |ω|, it lies between q¯τ and qτ . When
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pollutants are substitutes, the mix policy departs further from the optimal level of
abatement than mixes involving just one instrument.
Lemma 2 Total abatement is ranked as follows:
(a) If b > m + ω, then 2q¯ > 2q∗ > q¯τ + q¯ > 2qτ for costs higher than expected and
2qτ > q¯τ + q¯ > 2q∗ > 2q¯ for costs lower than expected.
(b) If b < m + ω, then 2q¯ > q¯τ + q¯ > 2q∗ > 2qτ for costs higher than expected and
2qτ > 2q∗ > q¯τ + q¯ > 2q¯ for costs lower than expected.
Overall the rankings of abatement eﬀorts under only prices and under only quan-
tities are consistent with Weitzman (1974): under-abatement under prices and over-
abatement under quantities if marginal costs are higher than expected. The reverse
holds if costs are lower than expected. Both results hold regardless of ω. Hence, the
issue of complementarity vs. substitutivity in abatement costs does not seem to matter
when comparing abatement levels under prices and quantities. Nevertheless, as we will
see later on, it does aﬀect the comparison of welfare as the marginal cost to be consid-
ered now should take into account the joint abatement parameter m+ ω and not only
m. This is important since it determines the choice of regulation instrument.
What is new compared to Weitzman (1974) is the mix policy whereby one pollutant
is taxed and the other is constrained by a quota. In this case, the ranking of abatement
for the pollutant that is taxed does depend on ω . To see this, consider ﬁrst the case
where the marginal abatement cost is higher than expected. From Lemma 1, we know
that in that case q¯ > qτ . Then mq+ωq¯ > mq+ωqτ if ω > 0 (substitute pollutants) and
mq + ωq¯ < mq + ωqτ if ω < 0 (complement pollutants). When equalising the marginal
cost of abating to its marginal beneﬁt τ , the ﬁrm abates less under the mix policy in
the former than in the latter case. By analogy, q¯ < qτ if the marginal cost is lower than
expected. Then mq + ωq¯ < mq + ωqτ if ω > 0 and mq + ωq¯ > mq + ωqτ if ω < 0.
Therefore, the incentives go in opposite directions: the ﬁrm abates more under the mix
policy if ω > 0 and less if ω < 0. Overall, such an abatement strategy departs further
from the ﬁrst-best when pollutants are substitutes, while it moves closer to the ﬁrst-best
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when pollutants are complements.10 It is then no surprise that the mix policy is never a
good instrument when pollutants are substitutes whereas it could eventually dominate
the price or quantity instruments when they are complements, as we will see latter.
To compare the performance of the three regulations, we need to compute the welfare.
This comparison is done in Appendix A, and it leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 We have the following ranking of regulations for both the ex ante and
ex post welfare for any realisation of ω.
(a) Under substitute pollutants, the quota regulation dominates if b > m+ ω; the tax
regulation dominates otherwise. The mix regulation is always dominated by quotas
or taxes.
(b) Under complement pollutants, the quota regulation dominates if b > m, the mix
regulation dominates for m > b > b̂ and the tax regulation dominates for b < b̂,
where b̂ is defined in (23).
The result (a) is just a generalisation of Weitzman (1974) with multiple pollutants.
It basically tells us that the criteria for choosing policy instruments under uncertainty
is the same as in Weitzman (1974), yet the marginal cost to be considered should take
into account the joint abatement parameter ω and not only m . The result (b) is more
interesting. Compared to Weitzman (1974), having more than one pollutant enlarges
the set of instruments: some pollutants can be priced while others can be regulated by
quotas. The proposition points out that a mix policy can be a good option in some cases,
even though the pollutants are symmetric in term of costs and beneﬁt, and hence, one
would expect that the same instrument should be applied to both pollutants. Indeed,
the policy mix is welfare enhancing when pollutants are complements and the slope of
the marginal beneﬁt and cost curves are close. In contrast, for very diﬀerent marginal
cost and beneﬁt slopes, only one instrument should be applied to both pollutants, in
the spirit of Weitzman.
10In the latter case, whether it is higher or lower than the ﬁrst-best depends on the magnitudes of b
and ω.
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3 Complementarity or substitutivity unknown by the reg-
ulator
Suppose now that the regulator does not know whether the two pollutants are comple-
ments or substitutes in the ﬁrm’s cost abatement function. Now the complementarity
and substitutivity parameter ω is subject to information asymmetry, and we set θ = 0.
The cost function is simpliﬁed to
C(q1, q2, ω) =
mq21
2
+
mq22
2
+ ωq1q2,
where ω is the ﬁrm’s private information. The regulator believes that ω ∈ [ω, ω] and
E[ω] = 0. The parameter m is common knowledge.
The beneﬁt of pollution abatement is the same as deﬁned by (1) for i = 1, 2. Total
welfare with pollution reductions q1 and q2 is then
W (q1, q2, ω) = B(q1) +B(q2)− C(q1, q2, ω).
Marginal beneﬁts and costs are
Bi(qi) = a− bqi,
Ci(q1, q2, ω) = mqi + ωqj,
for i = 1, 2 and j = i. For a given realisation of ω, the ﬁrst-best emission abatements
(q∗1 , q
∗
2) maximizes the ex-post welfare W (q1, q2, ω) which yields the following ﬁrst order
conditions:
Bi(q
∗
i ) = Ci(q
∗
i , q
∗
j , ω)
for i = 1, 2 with j = i. Since the two pollutants are symmetric, eﬃcient abatement is
the same q∗1 = q
∗
2 = q
∗. Substituting with the functional forms, the above condition
simpliﬁes to
a− bq∗ = (m+ ω)q∗. (10)
14
Therefore, expost eﬃcient abatement levels are
q∗ =
a
b+m+ ω
, (11)
for both pollutants.11
The quota regulation equalises marginal beneﬁt to expected marginal costs:
Bi(qi) = E[Ci(qi, qj , ω)],
for i = 1, 2, j = i. Since the beneﬁt and costs are symmetric, quotas are the same,
q¯1 = q¯2 = q¯, and the above ﬁrst-order condition simpliﬁes to
a− bq = mq. (12)
Thus, the quotas for both pollutants are
q¯ =
a
b+m
. (13)
Under the tax regulation, a ﬁrm of cost type ω reacts to the tax rate τi for pollutant i
by equalising its marginal abatement cost to the tax rate for i = 1, 2:12
τi = Ci(qi, qj, ω), (14)
for i = 1, 2, j = i and every ω ∈ [ω, ω] . The regulator maximises the expected welfare
E[W (q1, q2, ω)] subject to the ﬁrm’s reaction constraints (14) for i = 1, 2. Since pollu-
tants are symmetric, the tax rate is the same, τ1 = τ2 = τ , and so are abatement levels
under tax, qτ1 = q
τ
2 = q
τ . The ﬁrm’s reaction (or incentive-compatibility) constraints
(14) for i = 1, 2 simplify to
τ = (m+ ω)qτ . (15)
Maximising E[W (qτ , qτ )] with respect to τ under the ﬁrm’s reaction constraints (15)
leads the regulator to choose the tax rates corresponding to the marginal beneﬁt at the
exante ﬁrst-best τ = a− bq¯, while the ﬁrm reacts by choosing
qτ =
τ
m+ ω
=
a− bq¯
m+ ω
=
m
m+ ω
q¯ =
am
(m+ ω)(b+m)
, (16)
11To simplify notation, we write q∗ instead of q∗(ω) even though ex post eﬃcient abatements depend
on ω.
12To simplify notation, we write qτ instead of qτ (ω) even though abatements under tax depend on ω.
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where the last two equalities come from the deﬁnition of q¯ in (13).
Consider now the mix policy consisting of setting a tax for pollutant 1 and a quota
for pollutant 2. The best policy mix (τ, q¯) maximises the expected welfare E[W (q¯, q)]
under the ﬁrm’s reaction constraint:
τ = mq + ωq¯. (17)
Hence, as in the preview section, and contrary to the tax regulation, with a mix policy,
the ﬁrm adjusts emissions of one pollutant only, while the other is ﬁxed by the quotas.
Consequently, the two reaction constraints (15) and (17) diﬀer. Under our assumption,
it is easy to show that the optimal tax-quota policy equalises the marginal beneﬁt to
the expected marginal cost for the quota, i.e.
a− bq¯ = mq¯,
and the tax rate equals the expected marginal cost with a quota or, equivalently, the
marginal beneﬁt with a quota:
τ = a− bq¯ = mq.
Hence, ﬁrms react to the above tax rate by abating:
q¯τ =
τ − ωq¯
m
=
m− ω
m
q¯ =
a(m− ω)
m(b+m)
. (18)
The above analysis can more easily be understood using a graph.
16

q
τ
q¯
B′(q) mq
mq + ωq¯
(m+ ω)q
q∗ q¯τ qτ
Case ω < 0
0
Figure 3. Complement pollutants ω < 0 unknown
Figure 3 describes the case when pollutants are complements. The expected marginal
abatement cost function is given by mq. The realised marginal costs are mq + ωq¯ and
(m+ ω)q with the mix policy and with taxes respectively. Hence, the quota q¯ and tax
rate τ are found where the marginal beneﬁt curve B(q) = a − bq crosses the expected
marginal abatement cost curve. In particular, the tax rate τ is set to equalise marginal
beneﬁt to expected marginal abatement cost.
When abatement eﬀorts turn out to be complements, abatement costs are lower than
expected. The ﬁrm then chooses to abate more under tax than under quota. Indeed,
since the ﬁrm compares the marginal cost to the beneﬁt of abatement, which is the tax
level calibrated on an expected higher cost, it ﬁnds it proﬁtable to abate further to save
on taxes. In the graph, the ﬁrm picks the abatement level where the tax rate τ crosses
the marginal cost curve mq+ωq¯ or (m+ω)q depending on whether the other pollutant
is regulated with a quota or a tax. Abatement is increased for only one pollutant if
the other is regulated with quotas and both if both pollutants are regulated through
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taxes. In the latter case, more abatement of pollutant 2 further reduces the marginal
cost of abatement of pollutant 1. Therefore, pollution reduction is increased further
under taxes on both pollutants. Formally, if ω < 0 then q¯τ < qτ . This eﬀect is due to
the complementarity of abatement eﬀort: if the change were on the level of the marginal
cost for pollutant 1 like in Weitzman (1974), then the abatement eﬀort for pollutant
1 would be the same regardless of whether pollutant 2 is regulated through a tax or a
quota.
The symmetric case of substitute pollutants ω > 0 is represented in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Substitute pollutants ω > 0 unknown
In this case, given the tax rate τ , the ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to reduce pollution
abatement (or to increase pollution emissions) under tax compared to under quota.
Only pollutant 1’s emissions abatement is reduced if pollutant 2 is regulated through
a quota. Both pollutant abatement are reduced when both are taxed. In the latter
case, a decrease in abatement of pollutant 2 reduces the marginal cost of abatement of
pollutant 1. As a consequence, the ﬁrm increases abatement of pollutant 1 to a larger
extent when the pollutant is taxed: q¯τ < qτ . Therefore, regardless of whether the
pollutants are substitutes or complements in the cost function, abatement is higher if
the other pollutant is regulated through taxes.
Next we will compare the impact of the three policy instruments on abatement for a
given realisation of ω. We will then discuss their impact on expost and exante welfare.
Since m > ω for every ω ∈ [ω, ω], comparing equations (13), (16) and (18) for a given ω
leads to Lemmas 3 and 4.
Lemma 3 Abatement under tax qτ , under quota q¯, and under the mix policy for the
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taxed pollutant q¯τ are ranked as follows:
(a) If pollutants are substitutes, ω > 0, q¯τ < qτ < q∗ < q¯.
(b) If pollutants are complements, ω < 0, q¯ < q∗ < q¯τ < qτ .
Lemma 4 Total abatement is ranked as follows:
(a) If pollutants are substitutes, ω > 0, 2qτ < q¯τ + q¯ < 2q∗ < 2q¯.
(b) If pollutants are complements, ω < 0, 2q¯ < q¯τ + q¯ < 2q∗ < 2qτ .
As in the previous section, Lemma 3 indicates that when pollutants are complements,
the mix policy brings the abatement level induced by the taxed pollutant closer to
the ﬁrst-best. Yet when the pollutants are substitutes, the policy mix departs further
from the ﬁrst-best. This can be explained by the interaction of two factors: (1) the
technological externality that leads taxes to induce over-abatement when the pollutants
are complements, while the reverse holds when they are substitutes; (2) the level of the
quota, i.e. if pollutants are complements, the level of abatement under the quota is lower
than the ﬁrst-best, while the reverse holds when they are substitutes. Hence, to anchor
the tax to a quota reduces the deviation from the ﬁrst-best since these two factors set
against each other. Instead, these two factors boost each other when pollutants are
substitutes; the fact that there is too much abatement of the pollutant subjected to the
quota implies that ﬁrms must reduce the abatement of the taxed pollutant to a much
larger extent than optimal.
Nevertheless, the mix still brings aggregate abatement closer to the optimal. Indeed,
as stated by Lemma 4, if the pollutants are substitutes, the optimal level of aggregate
abatement 2q∗ lies between q¯τ + q¯ and 2q¯ . Under the mix policy, ﬁrms abate less than
optimal. The reverse holds for the quota regulation. If the pollutants are complements,
the optimal level of aggregate abatement 2q∗ lies between q¯τ + q¯ and 2qτ . Firms abate
less than optimal under the mix policy, while there is too much abatement under the
tax regulation.
In order to ﬁnd the best instruments depending on the economic environment, we
need to compare welfare under the three regulatory instruments. Let us ﬁrst consider the
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expost welfare, i.e. for a given realisation of ω. This comparison laid out in Appendix
B leads to the following conclusions:
Proposition 2 For a given ω, we have the following results:
(a) The price regulation dominates the quantity regulation if and only if b < m+ ω.
(b) The mix policy (tax-quota) dominates the quantity regulation if and only if b < m.
Although Proposition 2 does not rank all instruments regarding ex post welfare, it
does provide some partial comparisons. Result (a) has the same ﬂavor as the generalisa-
tion of Weitzman (1974) in Proposition 1. It turns out that price regulations dominate
quota regulations expost when the slope of the marginal beneﬁt functions b is steeper
than the slope of the overall marginal costs m+ ω for any realisation of ω. This expost
dominance is not easy to translate exante because the slope of the marginal costs m+ω
depends itself on the realisation of ω. Thus, taxes might dominate for some realisation of
ω while quota might dominate for others. We can only conclude that the exante welfare
is higher with tax (resp. quota) than with quota (resp. tax) if the marginal beneﬁt
functions are steeper that the marginal cost functions for any realisation of ω. This for-
mally leads to (a) and (b) in Corollary 1. From Proposition 2 we can straightforwardly
conclude (c) in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1
(a) Prices dominate quantities if b < m+ ω.
(b) Quantities dominate prices if b > m+ ω.
(c) If b < m then at least one pollutant should be taxed.
To be able to fully rank the three instruments, we make a further simpliﬁcation
assumption. We assume that ω can take only two values −δ and +δ with the same
probability (so that the E[ω] = 0) with m > −δ and δ > 0. By comparing exante
welfare with the three instruments in Appendix B, we obtain the following ranking:
Proposition 3 If ω ∈ {−δ,+δ} then there exists b˜ < m such that:
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(a) For b > m, the quota regulation dominates.
(b) For b˜ < b < m, the mix regulation dominates.
(c) For b < b˜, the tax regulation dominates.
When the technological externality parameter ω is unknown by the regulator, each of
the three regulatory instruments can be optimal depending on the slope of the marginal
beneﬁt and cost functions. When the marginal beneﬁt function is steeper than the
marginal cost function, i.e. when b > m, then both pollutants should be regulated with
quotas. The intuition is similar to that in Weitzman (1974). With steeper marginal
beneﬁt than marginal cost, the loss of welfare is lower with quotas than with taxes since
the quotas are closer to the ﬁrst-best abatement levels than the ﬁrm’s abatement choices
with taxes. Now consider the reverse case b < m. Following Weitzman (1974), the tax
regulation should dominate the quota regulation. However, with two pollutants, a third
instrument, i.e the policy mix (tax on one pollutant and quota on the other) enters into
the picture. It indeed dominates taxes when the slope of the marginal cost and beneﬁt
curves b and m are close but still b < m. This is easy to understand if we compare the
ﬁrm’s abatement strategy under the policy mix and under taxes. Under the policy mix,
only one pollutant is chosen by the ﬁrm (the other one is ﬁxed by the quota) whereas
under taxes both are chosen. If the two pollutants turn out to be complements, then
abatement is cheaper for the ﬁrm than expected by the regulator. Then, the ﬁrm would
choose to abate more of each pollutant than under quotas. This is true for only one
pollutant under the policy mix and for both pollutants under taxes. Since the increase
in abatement of one pollutant further reduces the abatement marginal cost of the other
pollutant, the ﬁrm abates even more of the taxed pollutant under tax than under the
policy mix. The case of substitute pollutants is the oppossite. Since marginal cost is
higher than expected, the ﬁrm under-abates more of the taxed pollutant under the mix
policy than under taxes. The deviation from the ﬁrst-best for the taxed pollutant under
the policy mix is indeed ampliﬁed by the technological externality. Yet it is at the
beneﬁt of having more abatement of the pollutant regulated by quota When b is close
to m, more precisely as long as b˜ < b < m, the welfare gain due to the quota of one
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pollutant is higher than the distortion in the level of abatement of the pollutant that is
taxed. Therefore the mix policy dominates. Nevertheless, the loss of welfare is higher
when b < b˜ and, therefore, taxes are better.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we analyse the eﬀects of the choice of policy instruments when ﬁrms
can abate more than one pollutant at the same time. We consider successively two
cases: (1) the case where the regulator knows that the abatement technology used by
the ﬁrm exhibit some complementarity or substitutivity in abatement eﬀorts and only
the information on the magnitude of the marginal cost is asymmetric; (2) the case
where asymmetric information concerns whether or not the pollutants are complement
or substitutes in the abatement process.
Overall, the paper highlights that the technological externality parameter is an im-
portant component of the choice of instruments under asymmetric information on abate-
ment costs. First, since it impacts marginal costs, it is a key parameter that determines
whether pricing both pollutants dominates setting quotas on emissions. When this pa-
rameter is known by the regulator, the technological externality plays the same role as
in Weitzman (1974). When it is not known by the regulator, then the dominance is
not clear since it depends on the distribution of the technological externality parameter.
Yet in Proposition 3 we derive conditions on the economic environment for which price
or quantity regulations dominate. Second, we provide some rationale for a mix policy
instrument consisting of taxing one pollutant and setting a quota on the other. It turns
out that this policy mix is optimal when pollutants are complements and the slope of
the marginal beneﬁts and costs are close. When the complementarity or substitutability
parameter is unknown by the regulator, the mix policy might still dominate for similar
slopes for the marginal beneﬁt and cost functions. In this case, all three instruments
might dominate depending on marginal costs and beneﬁts.
In our setup with perfectly symmetric pollutants, the dominance of the mix policy
is somewhat surprising. Although the two pollutants have exactly the same beneﬁt
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and cost functions, it turn out that they should be regulated diﬀerently: one should be
taxed and one should be limited with a quota. Intuitively, such a mix policy is attractive
because it allows some, but not too much ﬂexibility for the ﬁrms. However, whether
or not the policy mix brings abatement closer to the ﬁrst-best depends on whether
pollutants are complements or substitutes in the abatement eﬀorts. If pollutants are
complements, a regulation based on only taxes leads the ﬁrm to too much abatement
since it will overlook the abatement costs. The mix policy limits the distortion on the
taxed pollutant since the other pollutant is ﬁxed by the quota to a lower level. If they
instead are substitutes, there is too much abatement of the pollutant subjected to the
quota, which implies that the deviation from the ﬁrst-best is increased as the ﬁrm must
reduce the abatement of the pollutant that is taxed to a much larger extent than optimal.
We have assumed that pollutants are symmetric in order to facilitate our presen-
tation. If pollutants were asymmetric, it would be diﬃcult to compare welfare under
diﬀerent policy mixes. However, the rankings of abatement under diﬀerent policy mixes
would remain the same for interior solutions, since the driving force explaining our re-
sults is the technological interaction between the pollutants and because of the fact that
the regulator can reduce the deviations from the ﬁrst-best by mixing taxes and quotas.
It should be noted that we have considered that the two pollutants are regulated by a
single regulator. Yet, in many contexts, several administrations at diﬀerent levels (local,
national, supranational) deal with diﬀerent (air, water, waste) pollution problems for
historical or practical reasons. We could easily extend our analysis with two regulators,
each of them being in charge of one pollutant. Then further sources of ineﬃciency might
arise as they do not coordinate their choices of policy instruments. Such coordination
ineﬃciencies would potentially modify the choice of instruments for a given set of pa-
rameters. Although the choice of policy instruments by diﬀerent regulators is relevant
in practice, its analysis is beyond the scope of our paper.
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4.1 Appendix A
We ﬁrst compute the ex post welfare under the three regulations when ω is known for
any realisation of θ. We then rank the three regulations according to the ex post welfare.
W (q¯, q¯, ω, θ) = 2q¯(a− b+m+ ω
2
q¯ − θ) = 2w(q¯, ω, θ),
W (qτ , qτ , ω, θ) = 2qτ (a− b+m+ ω
2
qτ − θ) = 2w(qτ , ω, θ),
W (q¯τ , q¯, ω, θ) = w(q¯τ , ω, θ) + w(q¯, ω, θ),
where w(q, ω, θ) = q(a− θ − b+m+ω2 q).
Taxes vs quotas
ΔW1 = W (q
τ , qτ , ω, θ)−W (q, q, ω, θ),
ΔW1 = (q
τ − q¯) [2(a− θ)− (b+m+ ω)(qτ + q¯)] . (19)
Since qτ = m−ωm q¯ by (7),
ΔW1 = −θ
2(b−m− ω)
(m+ ω)2
.
Therefore ΔW1 > 0 if and only if b < m+ ω: taxes dominate quotas if b < m+ ω; the
reverse holds if b > m+ ω.
Mix policy vs quotas
ΔW2 = W (q¯
τ
1 , q2, ω, θ)−W (q1, q2, ω, θ),
ΔW2 = [q¯
τ − q]
[
a− θ − b+m
2
(q¯τ + q¯)− ωq¯
]
. (20)
Since q¯τ = q¯ − θm by (9) and using (4), we obtain
ΔW2 = −θ
2(b−m)
2m2
.
Therefore ΔW2 > 0 if and only if b < m: the mix policy dominates quotas when
b > m;the reverse holds when b < m.
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Taxes vs mix policy
ΔW3 = W (q
τ , qτ , ω, θ)−W (q¯τ , q, ω, θ) = ΔW1 −ΔW2,
ΔW3 =
−θ(b−m− ω)
(m+ ω)2
+
θ2(b−m)
2m2
ΔW3 = θ
2 (b−m)(ω2 + 2mω −m2) + 2m2ω
2m2(m+ ω)2
.
Therefore ΔW3 > 0 if and only if b < bˆ where bˆ is deﬁned by
bˆ =
m(m2 − ω2)
m2 − 2mω − ω2 . (21)
The tax regulation dominates the mix regulation if b < bˆ while the reverse holds if b > bˆ.
Policy ranking
• Substitute pollutants ω > 0. Sincem < m+ω, then quotas dominate for b > m+ω
and taxes dominate for b < m+ ω. The mix policy is always dominated by either
taxes or quotas.
• Complement pollutants ω < 0. Since m + ω < m and bˆ < b, each of the three
regulations can be the best one: quotas for b > m, mix for b ∈ [bˆ,m] and taxes for
b < bˆ.
Since the above ranking holds expost for any realization of θ, then it also holds
exante (i.e. with the exante welfare as the regulator’s objective).
4.2 Appendix B
We ﬁrst compute the ex post and ex ante welfares under the three regulations when ω
is ﬁrm’s private information.
W (q1, q2, ω) = q [2a− [b+m+ ω] q]
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Taxes vs. quotas
ΔW1 = W (q
τ , qτ , ω)−W (q, q, ω),
ΔW1 = 2a [q
τ − q]− [b+m+ ω] [(qτ )− (q)] ,
ΔW1 = [q
τ − q] [2a− [b+m+ ω] [qτ + q]] .
Since qτ = mm+ω q¯, the last equation becomes
ΔW1 = a [q
τ − q]
[
2− [b+m+ ω] [2m+ ω]
[b+m] [m+ ω]
]
,
ΔW1 = −ω2q2
[
[b−m− ω]
[m+ ω]2
]
.
Hence ΔW1 > 0 if and only if b < m+ ω, regardless of ω.
We will now compare the ex ante welfare when ω can take two values −δ and δ with
equal probability.
E[ΔW1] =
−δ2q2
2
[
[b−m− δ]
[m+ δ]2
+
[b−m+ δ]
[m− δ]2
]
,
E[ΔW1] =
−δ2q2
2
[
2b
[
m2 + δ2
]− 2m [m2 − δ2]
[m+ δ]2 [m− δ]2
]
.
In this case, there is a critical value b′ = m[m
2−δ2]
m2+δ2
< m determining whether E[ΔW1]
is positive or negative. If b < b′, E[ΔW1) > 0], therefore taxes dominate quotas.
Policy mix vs. quotas
ΔW2 = W (q¯
τ , q, ω)−W (q, q, ω),
ΔW2 = [q¯
τ − q]
[
a−
[
b+m
2
]
[q¯τ + q]− ωq
]
.
Since q¯τ = m−ωm q¯, the last equality becomes
ΔW2 = −ω2q2
[
b−m
2m2
]
.
Hence ΔW2 > 0 if b < m, regardless of ω. Therefore the ex ante welfare is higher
under the policy mix than under quotas if and only if b < m.
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Taxes vs. policy mix
ΔW3 = W (q
τ , qτ , ω)−W (q¯τ , q, ω) = ΔW1 −ΔW2,
ΔW3 = aω [q
τ − q]
[
[b−m− ω]
[b+m] [m+ ω]
]
− aω [q¯τ1 − q]
[
b−m
2m [b+m]
]
,
ΔW3 = w
2q2
[
[m− b] [m2 − ω2]+ 2bmω
2m2 [m+ ω]2
]
.
Again, let us consider that ω takes two values −δ and δ with equal probability. The
expected variation of welfare is
E[ΔW3] =
δ2q2
2
[
[m− b] [m4 − δ4]− 4bm2δ2
m2 [m+ δ]2 [m− δ]2
]
.
In this case, there is a critical value b˜ =
m[m4−δ4]
[m4−δ4]+4m2δ2 < m determining whether
E[ΔW3] is positive or negative. E[ΔW3] > 0, and therefore taxes dominate the policy
mix if and only if b < b˜.
Policy ranking To fully rank the three policy instruments when ω takes two values
with equal probability, note that m > b˜ > b′.
• If b > m, quantities dominate prices and the tax-quantity mix.
• If b ∈
[
b˜,m
]
, the policy mix dominates quantities and prices.
• If b < b˜, prices dominate quantities and the tax-quantity mix.
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